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Abstract 
Managing shipboard industrial fire safety during a depot or intermediate level maintenance 
availability on a commissioned naval vessel can be viewed as a complex system bounded by the 
defense acquisition system. Sociotechnical factors define the hazard and associated risk and risk 
management practices, and this complex system governs the resulting level of fire safety. Poor 
industrial fire safety practices during naval ship maintenance availabilities can directly impact 
project cost and schedule. If a fire is severe enough, these effects can trickle throughout the ship 
class’s maintenance program, adversely impacting fleet readiness and operations. Traditional 
viewpoints on fire safety prescriptively regulate the fire hazard. Rote compliance with this type of 
requirement does not provide clear mechanisms for measuring safety performance, resulting in 
uneven risk management. This paper presents a safety management system (SMS) framework 
for shipboard industrial fire safety based on the Complex Systems Governance (CSG) reference 
model developed by Keating and Bradley (2015). The value of a clearly defined governance 
model and SMS framework in conjunction with industry standardization and information sharing is 
the emergence of trends. This supports feedback loops between requirements and outcomes, 
allowing more effective management of fire safety across the broad stakeholder groups involved.  
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Introduction  
Shipboard fire incidents during industrial construction and maintenance activities pose a 
significant threat to fielding the required naval force strength. Naval vessels transition in and out 
of construction and maintenance periods throughout their life cycle, and protecting them from 
fires during industrial work is a complex issue. Fire risk involves not only risk associated with the 
fire itself, but also the risk associated with loss of an operational asset. The impact of small fires 
during ship construction or overhaul could be minor property damage or injury to a worker or 
sailor. Larger fires can result in schedule delays or loss of life, and a major fire can result in the 
total loss of a ship.  
When the USS Miami (SSN 755) was decommissioned after suffering a major fire while 
in dry dock at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in 2012, five deployments over her remaining 10-year 
operational life were lost (McDermott, 2013). Investigation of the July 12, 2020, fire aboard the 
USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) while pier side at Naval Base San Diego, CA, towards the 
end of a GD NASSCO overhaul availability is ongoing, with the ship declared a total loss in early 
2021 (Ziezulewicz, 2021). Shortly after this fire, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development, and Acquisition James Geurts (2020) issued a memorandum to the entire 
shipbuilding and ship maintenance enterprise stating, “Preventing shipboard fires is a team 
sport, no matter where the ship is in its life cycle, and no matter who is working on the ship,” and 
“There is no place in our Navy for complacency – the lives of our teammates and the 
accomplishment of our mission depends upon it” (p. 1). 
The USS Miami (SSN 775) Fire Panel Recommendations (Gortney, 2012, p. 1) also cite 
complacency, stating “the MIAMI investigation paints a picture of multiple processes within 
several organizations going through the motions, with no particular failure, but lacking focused 
attention and oversight, and missing the mark in the aggregate”, and “it is clear that the Navy 
has unintentionally accepted a reduced margin to fire safety when a ship enters an industrial 
environment -- where the risk of fire is at its highest.” In the weeks following the major fire on 
USS Bonhomme Richard, minor fire incidents related to hot work occurred on the USS John F 
Kennedy (CVN 79) at HII-Newport News Shipbuilding and USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) at GD 
NASSCO in Norfolk, VA (Eckstein, 2020), serving as a wake-up call to the industry.  
A few months prior to the USS Bonhomme Richard fire, Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) presented the results of an effort initiated in June 2019 in response to 2018 fires 
aboard USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79) and USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) to assess industrial fire 
safety, fire prevention, and control programs based on self-assessment responses and reported 
data on fires that had occurred over the previous 30 months at public and private maritime 
maintenance facilities (McGowan & Smith, 2020). Their effort is summarized herein and built 
upon to propose the framework for a data-driven direction to addressing the Navy’s shipboard 
industrial fire problem.  
In June 2020, the Navy issued a new Safety and Occupational Health Manual that 
established the Navy Safety Management System (SMS) to “facilitate a transition from 
reactively managing safety to proactively managing safety and risk, and ultimately, to become 
predictive” (U.S. Department of the Navy [DoN], 2020, p. A1-2). This evolving direction provides 
an opportunity for deliberate implementation of a novel approach to managing fire safety during 
naval ship maintenance availabilities.  
Our approach aims to assess common systemic threads in major safety mishaps—
contributions of the system that frames management of risk to outcomes and the relationship 
between complacency and responsibility. The dual incidents of the recent major fire aboard 
USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) and total loss of the USS Miami parallel the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) dual losses of space shuttles Challenger in 
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1986 and Columbia in 2003, albeit separated by a much shorter period of time. The Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) identified organizational system failures and flawed 
organizational practices, including complacency and cultural beliefs. Specifically, “history again 
at work: how past definitions of risk combined with systemic problems in the NASA organization 
caused both accidents” (Columbia Accident Investigation Board [CAIB], 2003, p. 195). 
We propose an SMS framework for shipboard industrial fire safety based on the 
Complex Systems Governance (CSG) reference model developed by Keating and Bradley 
(2015) to inform the transition from regulating fire hazards to systematic management of fire 
safety during maintenance availabilities on commissioned naval vessels. The focus is on 
developing feedback loops between requirements and outcomes through a data-driven 
approach to support proactive management of shipboard industrial fire safety, a reduction in lost 
operational days due to fire incidents, and identification of the gaps that must be addressed to 
implement this framework. 
Table 1. Research Goals and Objectives 
Goals Objectives 
Dissect the shipboard industrial 
fire safety problem, including 
acquisition system influences  
Evaluate the problem within the sociotechnical 
safety perspective on risk 
Evaluate the problem with respect to defense-in-
depth 
Develop an SMS framework for 
Shipboard Industrial Fire Safety 
based on the CSG reference 
model 
Evaluate the problem within the Cynefin framework 
Evaluate how the Navy SMS framework integrates 
into the CSG reference model 
Identify necessary feedback loops between 
requirements and outcomes 
Identify gaps between framework architecture and 
the current state 
 
 
NAVSEA Shipboard Industrial Fire Incident Data Analysis Summary 
In June 2019, “COMNAVSEA directed Naval activities and requested private 
maintenance facilities to report all fires over the last 30 months. NAVSEA received responses 
from public and private maritime maintenance facilities. These responses were analyzed by 
04RS for completeness, self-reflection, and innovation/solutions” (McGowan & Smith, 2020, 
slide 2). Data from 339 fire incidents were reviewed, and NAVSEA 04RS (Industrial Operations, 
Safety) performed an analysis of causal factors using the Department of Defense’s Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) to identify trends and lessons learned. The 
top three sources of shipboard fires during industrial work were hot work, electrical, and 
temporary sources. Shipboard industrial fire incidents were also analyzed with regards to the 
Cognizant Activity and controlling document for fire safety requirements. Results are 
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Figure 1. Fire Reporting Data  
(McGowan & Smith, 2020, slide 4) 
 
Regardless of the source of the requirements, non-compliance related to fundamental 
fire prevention practices was identified as the cause of 85% of hot work fires, which occurred in 
improperly prepared areas. The distribution of fires among Cognizant Activities is related to the 
volume of work overseen by each, suggesting that the problem is universal across the naval 
maritime repair industry.  
Significant findings outlined next “were remarkably similar to other fires experienced by 
the Navy,” including “1942 SS Normandie, Total loss of the ship, 285 Injuries” and “1944 USS 
Saturn, 15 fatalities, 20 injuries.” “Both events were the result of improper hot-work controls” 
(McGowan & Smith, 2020, slide 8). These findings include the following: 
● Failure to follow the “35-foot rule” is the most frequent cause of hot work fires. 
● Port loading variations and high influx of temporary employees with low experience 
increase the likelihood of fire safety non-compliance. 
● Communication between fire watches and hot workers, and inspections by hot work 
supervisors, are less than adequate. 
● Failure to comply with the invoked standard (OSHA, NAVSEA Requirements) was 
common. (McGowan & Smith, 2020, slide 7) 
In addition to the analytic side of this effort, actions taken by NAVSEA included 
establishing new hot work requirements in NAVSEA Standard Item (NSI) Fiscal Year 2020, 
Change 2, and “VADM Moore wrote a letter to all parties stating that a ship repair contractor’s 
non-compliance with fire prevention standards and regulations is a contractual non-compliance” 
(McGowan & Smith, 2020, slide 10). A variety of recommendations to improve compliance were 
made for Naval maritime facilities (Naval shipyards, Regional Maintenance Centers (RMCs) and 
the Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP/SOS). Future initiatives identified by NAVSEA include 
sharing best practices across the industry and establishing a multi-functional committee to 
address issues uncovered through information sharing (McGowan & Smith, 2020). Uniformly 
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implementing good and best practices in private shipyards requires a combination of 
approaches, largely due to contractual influences.  
Methodology 
Defining the Problem 
Sociotechnical Safety Perspective on Risk  
The concept of a sociotechnical system is derived from the context of work systems and 
was defined by Ropohl (1999) as  
established to stress the reciprocal interrelationship between humans and 
machines and to foster the program of shaping both the technical and the social 
conditions of work, in such a way that efficiency and humanity would not contradict 
each other any longer. (p. 59)  
Sociotechnical systems in this sense are made up of a hierarchy of action systems, or 
subsystems, with three primary levels that perform the work, oversee the work, and set goals for 
the work. These subsystems can further be divided into sub-subsystems, and significant 
feedback loops and couplings exist between them. In the case of overhaul work on a 
commissioned naval vessel, these lines can sometimes be blurred, and a single organization 
can have functions within multiple subsystems. Sociotechnical is further defined by Aven and 
Ylönen (2018)  
to include the following dimensions: 1) two or more persons, interaction with some 
form of 2) technology, 3) and internal work environment (both physical and 
cultural), 4) external environment (can include political, regulatory, technological, 
economic, educational and cultural sub-environments), 5) an organisational design 
and management subsystems. (p. 14)  
Continuing the parallels to the dual NASA accidents, the CAIB devoted chapters of its 
report to discussing organizational causes, history as a cause, and decision-making within the 
organization. The report identified a broken safety culture and pointed to Naval Reactors and 
the Navy’s SUBSAFE programs as strong examples of a good culture, with key differences 
being requirements ownership (technical authority) and emphasis on lessons learned (CAIB, 
2003). 
Safety vs. Risk 
A goal of the Navy SMS is to proactively manage both safety and risk (DoN, 2020). To 
do this, it is important to distinguish between these two interrelated objectives. The Society for 
Risk Analysis Glossary defines safe as “without unacceptable risk,” and safety as “the antonym 
of risk” (Society for Risk Analysis [SRA], 2018, p. 7). Risk is given several qualitative definitions, 
but for the context of this paper we will use “the occurrences of some specified consequences of 
the activity and associated uncertainties” (SRA, 2018, p. 4). Möller et al. (2006) argue that 
safety goes beyond the antonym of risk due to epistemic uncertainty and proposed the 
intersubjective concept of safety: “(1) it is based on the comparative judgments of severity of 
harm that the majority of humans would agree on, and (2) it makes use of the best available 
expert judgments on the probabilities and uncertainties involved” (p. 427). Aven (2009) argues 
that safety is the antonym of risk for certain perspectives (definitions) of risk, specifically, when 
risk is the two-dimensional combination of uncertainty and consequences, uncertainty is integral 
to the definition, safety is the antonym of risk, and safe can be defined as “acceptable risk and 
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Defense-in-Depth 
Sorensen et al. (1999) identify that defense-in-depth as a nuclear industry safety 
strategy began development in the 1950s. Their review of the history of the term indicated that 
there was as of yet no official or preferred definition, but that when the term is used and if a 
definition is needed, “one is created consistent with the intended use of the term. Such 
definitions are often made by example” (p. 1). By 1999, the term had come to have two different 
meanings, roughly corresponding to the perspective of the particular model. Those perspectives 
were cast as either denoting “the philosophy of high level lines of defense, such as prevent 
accident initiators from occurring, terminate accident sequences quickly, and mitigate accidents 
that are not successfully terminated” (p. 3). The other portrays “the multiple physical barrier 
approach, most often exemplified by the fuel cladding, primary system, and containment” (p. 2). 
These two model perspectives are cast as either structuralist or rationalist:  
The structuralist model asserts that defense in depth is embodied in the structure 
of the regulations and in the design of the facilities built to comply with those 
regulations. The requirements for defense in depth are derived by repeated 
application of the question, “What if this barrier or safety feature fails?”. (pp. 3–4)  
Sorensen et al. (1999) portray that “the rationalist model asserts that defense in depth is 
the aggregate of provisions made to compensate for uncertainty and incompleteness in our 
knowledge of accident initiation and progression” (p. 4). They also assert that “the structuralist 
and rationalist models are not generally in conflict. Both can be construed as a means of dealing 
with uncertainty,” and further, they note that “neither incorporates any reliable means of 
determining when the degree of defense in depth achieved is sufficient” (p. 5).  
As more nuclear power plants were built and more service experience acquired, new 
rules were progressively added, yielding a very complex set of requirements for the last part of 
the existing fleet of reactors to be built. A variation of technical debt was building up; even with 
“the accumulation of experience with various incidents and accidents, a growing list of 
unresolved safety issues emerged” (Fleming & Silady, 2002, p. 206). Fleming and Silady (2002) 
highlight that even as requirements were increased,  
many additional incidents occurred, including literally hundreds of common cause 
failures in redundant safety systems. This experience casts doubt on the wisdom 
of excluding common cause failures from the design basis envelope, thereby 
exposing a serious limitation of the single failure criterion as a tool to help define 
what is credible. (p. 206) 
A footnote in Fleming and Silady (2002) notes that  
In the peer review of an earlier draft of this paper it was pointed out that the 
regulations governing nuclear power include one definition of defense-in-depth in 
10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R which sets rules for fire protection in older plants. This 
definition sets forth the following objectives for the defense-in-depth of fire 
protection. Prevent fires from starting, detect rapidly, control and extinguish the 
fires that do occur, and to protect SSCs needed to safely shutdown the plant from 
the effects of the fire and firefighting activities. (p. 207) 
Saleh et al. (2014), discussing the Texas City refinery fire, noted “a fundamental failure 
mechanism in this accident, namely the absence of observability or ability to diagnose 
hazardous states in the operation of the refinery, in particular within the raffinate splitter tower 
and the blowdown drum of the isomerization unit” (p. 1). They go on to “propose a general 
safety–diagnosability principle for supporting accident prevention, which requires that all safety-
degrading events or states that defense-in-depth is meant to protect against be diagnosable, 
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and that breaches of safety barriers be unambiguously monitored and reported.” Further 
“violation of the safety–diagnosability principle translates into a shrinking of the time window 
available for operators to understand an unfolding hazardous situation and intervene to abate 
it.” They go onto conclude that “defense-in-depth be augmented with this principle, without 
which it can degenerate into an ineffective defense-blind safety strategy” (Saleh et al., 2014, p. 
1).  
Cynefin Framework  
Cynefin framework is a sense-making framework first developed by a group of 
researchers at IBM “conducting a program of disruptive action research using the methods of 
narrative and complexity theory to address critical business issues” (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003, p. 
462). This work was partially funded through the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency 
(DARPA) with an interest in “new approaches to support policy-making” (Kurtz & Snowden, 
2003, p. 462). The group challenged three basic assumptions of decision-making and 
policymaking—order, rational choice, and intentional capability—believing that while commonly 
available tools and techniques assume they are true, they are not universally true. With regard 
to order, they discuss situations where lack of order isn’t a bad thing and the concept of 
emergent order (un-order) that is self-organizing rather than controlled and emerges from the 
interaction of many entities. Ordered-systems thinking has limitations because it assumes “we 
can derive or discover general rules or hypotheses that can be empirically verified and that 
create a body of reliable knowledge, which can then be developed and expanded” (Kurtz & 
Snowden, 2003, p. 466), and this does not hold true for all domains.  
Unlike the more traditional categorization framework with a two-by-two matrix where the 
most desirable condition exists in the upper right-hand quadrant, the Cynefin sense-making 
framework “is used primarily to consider the dynamics of situations, decisions, perspectives, 
conflicts, and changes in order to come to a consensus for decision-making under uncertainty” 
(Kurtz & Snowden, 2003, p. 468) and does not favor any of the domains as more desirable or 
imply value axes. The five domains, currently referred to as clear, complicated, complex, 
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Figure 2. Cynefin Framework and Relationships 
 
Descriptions of Domains 
Clear (simple) is the domain of the known, with clear cause and effect relationships that 
are undisputed and generally empirical in nature. It is the domain of structured techniques and 
process engineering, with focus on consistency and efficiency (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). In this 
ordered and obvious domain, optimal solutions can be identified. In other words, it is the domain 
of best practices (Fierro et al., 2018).  
Complicated is the domain of the knowable, or “known unknowns” (Fierro et al., 2018, p. 
6), with stable cause and effect relationships that are either not fully known or only known to a 
small group of people (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). With enough time and resources, anything in 
this domain could become known and move to the clear domain. Kurtz and Snowden (2003) 
described this as “the domain of methodology, which seeks to identify cause-effect relationships 
through the study of properties which appear to be associated with qualities” (p. 468). In this 
domain of reductionism, the goal is to analyze, versus categorize, and decompose a system or 
problem into its constituent parts with approaches governed by things like standard rules, 
procedures, and protocols manuals. Because there may be multiple right answers and multiple 
options must be considered, good practices are preferred to best practices (Fierro et al., 2018).  
Complex is the domain of the “unknown knowns” (Fierro et al., 2018, p. 8), where “there 
are cause and effect relationships between the agents, but both the number of agents and the 
number of relationships defy categorization or analytic techniques” (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003, p. 
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469). This is the domain of complexity theory, and “emergent patterns can be perceived but not 
predicted.” Fierro et al. (2018) refer to this domain as “unordered—obvious in hindsight” (p. 8), 
where the facts can be understood through reconstruction and rationalized after the fact. In this 
realm, there a range of potential failures, and emergent behaviors between highly 
interconnected subsystems can result in the emergence of different failure modes as actions are 
applied. The best approach in this domain is to “probe, sense, and then respond” (p. 8), and 
detailed planning is of minimal value due to the dynamic nature of sub-system interactions. An 
evolutionary strategy is recommended where solutions are developed in builds, and unlike an 
incremental strategy, it is acknowledged “that the user need is not fully understood and not all 
requirements can be defined up front” (p. 9). 
Chaotic is the domain of “unknown unknowns” (Fierro et al., 2018), where there are no 
perceivable relationships between cause and effect and there is insufficient response time to 
evaluate change because the system is turbulent. Here, best practices can contribute to the 
chaos because there is nothing to analyze and “waiting for patterns to emerge is a waste of 
time” (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). This is an unordered domain where “we don’t even know which 
are the relevant aspects related to the problem, and no information is available even to be able 
to define the problem” (Fierro et al., 2018). Response in this domain is to act quickly to reduce 
turbulence, sense where stability is or is not present based on this action, and then “respond by 
working to transform the situation from chaos to complexity, where the identification of emerging 
patterns can both help prevent future crises that discern new opportunities” (p. 12). This is also 
known as “the domain of novel practice” (p. 12) and can sometimes be desirable on the path to 
innovation.  
Confused or Aporetic, formerly Disorder, is at the interaction of the other domains of the 
Cynefin framework, reflective in the conflict of decision-makers approaching a problem from 
different points of view (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). In this domain, each decision-maker relies on 
their own comfort zone to pull the issue into the domain that plays to their strengths or desires. 
The goal in this domain is to adapt leadership styles based on context and shift the problem into 
the appropriate domain given the nature of the problem and decision-making context (Fierro et 
al., 2018). 
Complex Systems Governance  
Complex System Governance (CSG) is an emerging field formally defined by Keating et 
al. (2014) as the “design, execution, and evolution of the metasystem functions necessary to 
provide control, communication, coordination, and integration of a complex system” (p. 274). 
Theory and concepts are derived from the fields of systems theory, management cybernetics, 
and system governance. The domain of complex systems includes the characteristics of 
complexity, contextual dominance, ambiguity, and holistic nature. The governance perspective 
of CSG is rooted in the cybernetic perspective of “design for ‘regulatory capacity’ to provide 
appropriate controls capable of maintaining system balance” (Keating & Katina, 2019, p. 690) 
and differs from management by emphasizing outcomes versus outputs with a higher degree of 
separation between action and response. The CSG model provides a framework for improving 
system performance (Keating et al., 2019). Discovery, classification, and engagement are 
neither mutually exclusive nor interdependent aspects of the framework, facilitating emergence 
of unabsorbed pathologies and the ability to improve resilience of the system. Included meta-




Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 15 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Table 2. CSG Reference Model and Metasystem Definitions 
Policy and Identity (M5) – overall 
steering and trajectory for the system 
includes context and monitoring of the 
governance system. 
 
System Development (M4) – models 
current and future system; includes 
learning and environmental scanning. 
System Operations (M3) – day to day 
execution of the metasystem includes 
performance monitoring of the 
governed systems. 
Information and Communications (M2) 
– flow and interpretation of 
information necessary to execute 
metasystem functions; the "spine" of 
the system. 
Governed Systems (S1s) – the 
organizational components of the larger 
system that are governed by the meta-
systems. They are identified here as 
Regional Maintenance Commands and 
the Contractors executing work. 
 
CSG provides a suitable framework for modeling the complex relationships between the 
ship/ship’s force, contractor/activity performing the work, and various Navy activities involved in 
the management of shipboard industrial fire risk. A model-centric approach to evaluating these 
relationships and the delegation of ownership for each aspect of the sociotechnical problem 
reveals emergence of the system and reduces ambiguity, providing answers to questions such 
as who owns the risk and are all aspects of the risk accounted for? 
Navy Safety Management System Framework  
The Navy Safety program updated its policy in June 2020 with the release of a revised 
Navy Safety and Occupational Health Manual (DoN, 2020). This manual “establishes the Navy 
Safety Management System (SMS), a comprehensive framework that will ensure operational 
readiness through continuous improvement and risk-based decision making processes and 
procedures” (DoN, 2020, p. A1-2). It defines an SMS as “a system of processes that proactively 
manages day-to-day safety and risk management in an organization across all operations and 
business lines. It is not a single written policy or database” (DoN, 2020, p. A1-4). The 
Submarine Safety (SUBSAFE) Program is given as a Navy community-level example, with 
policy supporting the operational safety functional area of an SMS. 
The Navy SMS is a high-level framework intended to be both transparent and scalable. 
The policy applies directly to Navy civilian and military personnel and operations worldwide but 
is not applicable where Navy contractors are responsible directly to state or the Department of 
Labor (DOL) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for the occupational safety 
and health of its employees. However, the requirement for Navy SMS framework is an 
enterprise-level policy that encompasses areas beyond occupational safety, including industrial 
ship safety, industrial ship fire protection and prevention, and safety mishap reporting and 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 16 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
investigation (DoN, 2020). Shipboard industrial fire safety is unique in that requirements and 
outcomes can dually influence both occupational safety and ship safety. Maintaining ship 
conditions goes above and beyond what is required to protect workers, similar to how building 
and life safety codes distinguish between life safety and property protection requirements. 
The manual is a requirements document that outlines the minimum requirements for an 
SMS framework, consisting of “an iterative continuous improvement cycle, four pillars, and one 
or more minimum fundamental elements that underpin those pillars” (DoN, 2020, p. A1-6). The 
four pillars and their fundamental elements are depicted in Figure 3. 
 
• Leadership










• Sharing Best Practices 
and Lessons Learned








• Sharing Best Practices 
and Lessons Learned
• Informed Safety Culture





Figure 3. Four Pillars of a Navy SMS and Fundamental Elements 
 
Note that some of the fundamental elements cross, or exist, in multiple pillars. Personnel 
awareness, education, and training are fundamental to both “Policy and Organizational 
Commitment” and “Promotion.” Similarly, risk monitoring and change management cross “Risk 
Management” and “Assurance.” These particular elements are key to establishing feedback 
loops between requirements and outcomes, or the continuous improvement cycle. 
With regards to appointment of SMS personnel, “SMS-related responsibilities and 
authorities must be defined, documented, and communicated throughout the organization” and 
“Safety management system personnel must be appointed with the authority to execute SMS 
processes and programs.” Although aspects of shipboard industrial fire safety are distributed 
among various safety functional areas, NAVSEA 04RS[1] (Industrial Operations, Safety) the 
technical warrant holder (TWH) for safety policy, is emerging in a leadership role in addressing 
fires throughout the naval enterprise. Previously NAVSEA 04RS limited its scope to collecting 
data and sharing that data within the NAVSEA community. During the past 2 years, NAVSEA 
04RS has been engaged with the private shipbuilding community and the maritime industry at 
large to bring attention to the problem of fires onboard naval vessels during construction and 
maintenance availabilities. The focus of this paper is on identifying ownership, accountability, 
and communication channels as they relate to roles and responsibilities within the framework. 
Research Results 
The Sociotechnical Problem 
 Complexity emerges from decomposing contributing factors to the Navy’s shipboard 
industrial fire safety problem. Figure 4 outlines the sociotechnical factors that contribute to 
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industrial fire safety during ship maintenance availabilities in each of the five contributing 









































































Figure 4. Sociotechnical Decomposition of Shipboard Industrial Fire Safety 
 
In addition to the underlying technical factors, multiple parties are involved with managing the 
risk. Shipboard industrial fire risk management occurs at the intersection of the contracting authority 
overseeing the work (NAVSEA), the contractor performing the work, and the ship that is being worked on 
or constructed. For a commissioned ship, U.S. Navy Regulations dictate that when work is performed in a 
private shipyard under a contract being administered by the Supervisor of Shipbuilding Conversion and 
Repair, responsibility for safe execution of the work is assigned via contract to the contractor. The 
commanding officer retains responsibility for safety of the ship and requesting services necessary to 
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Figure 5. Relationship Between Risk Management Parties 
 
While the responsibility for ship safety is shared, the contractor is directly responsible for 
occupational safety (DoN, 2020). Unlike in the commercial shipbuilding and repair industry, 
Navy ship maintenance contracts do not require the contractor to retain a significant marine 
builder’s risk insurance policy, thus limiting the options for fire risk transfer between parties. This 
also limits the solution set for determining how to manage fire risk to what is in the contract, 
necessitating that the Government be specific in identifying fire protection and prevention 
measures above and beyond what is required by OSHA Standard 1915 Subpart P, Fire 
Protection in Shipyard Employment. The SUPSHIP Operations Manual states, 
Under vessel fixed-price contracts, the Government customarily assumes the 
same risk of loss or damage as would have been assumed by private insurance 
underwriters had the contractor obtained and maintained marine builders risk 
insurance. This risk is subject to a deductible as identified in the contract. (Naval 
Sea Systems Command, 2021, p. 3-101) 
Transferring more of the liability for determining how to provide adequate fire protection and 
prevention for commissioned naval vessels to a contractor would have the unintended 
consequence of increasing the amount of insurance the contractor would need to carry in order 
to assume this liability. 
Defense-in-Depth 
Ships are most vulnerable to fire during construction and overhaul periods because the 
normal layers of protection are not present. Permanent fire protection systems may be out of 
service, fire resistant boundaries may be compromised, less of the ship’s force is present, and 
many industrial workers are present. As opposed to strict controls on material aboard, 
temporary services are run throughout the ship, and a significant amount of combustible 
materials are brought on board. When a ship is at sea, sources of fire ignition are planned for in 
the design of protective measures. During industrial work, sources of fire ignition include 
industrial work evolutions, permanent or temporary services installed in the ship, and human 
causes such as discarded smoking materials or criminal acts. There is a high reliance on human 
intervention rather than a layered approach to protection, which can be a critical single point of 
failure in preventing the escalation of an incident. 
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Cynefin Domains  
Within the “Policy and Organizational Commitment” pillar of the Navy SMS framework, it 
is important to recognize that different management approaches are required for different 
aspects of the problem. Approaching decision-making modalities from the correct domain is as 
important as making decisions at the right level. This could mean best practices (clear domain), 
good practices (complicated domain), evolutionary or novel approaches, or decomposing the 
problem in order to shift it into a domain where it is more easily managed. Table 3 provides 
examples of shipboard industrial safety problems that currently exist within each Cynefin 
domain. Note that from a programmatic standpoint, this topic currently exists in the confused 
domain at the intersection of other domains primarily due to identified gaps that will be 
discussed in more detail in a later section of this paper. The goal of implementing an SMS 
framework based on the CSG model and using the Cynefin framework to analyze it is to 
decompose the problem in a manner that makes it manageable. 
 
Table 3. Industrial Fire Safety Examples in Each Cynefin Domain 
Complicated Clear 
The work done by the welding engineer to 
determine the welding requirements and 
produce the technical work documents for a 
particular work evolution. 
Skilled work (tasks) performed by a welder.  
Complex Chaotic 
Interaction between welding (hot work) and 
the surrounding environment. Factors such 
as type of welding, proximity to 
combustibles, fire resistant and non fire-
resistant separations, and adequacy of the 
fire watch all contribute to the safe 
execution of this work evolution. 
Introducing a transient and unequally trained 
workforce with a few workers that may 
randomly decide to follow no rules into ship 
repair work evolutions. While emergence 
between sub-systems in the shipboard fire 
safety problem should be discernable, this is 
only possible when all agents are playing by an 
identifiable and uniform set of rules. 
Confused/Aporetic 
From a programmatic standpoint, this is the current domain of shipboard industrial fire safety. 
 
System Architecture 
 The system of interest (SOI) in this paper, depicted in Figure 6, is a maintenance 
availability on a commissioned naval vessel (otherwise known as a project). Boundary 
conditions (other systems) that interact with this system include the acquisition system that 
contracts the work, the ship maintenance activity that undertakes the work, and the ship itself. 
The context includes the shipboard industrial fire safety system and associated requirements 
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Figure 6. Architecture of System of Interest 
 
SMS Framework and Complex System Governance Model  
 The governance model meta-function descriptions in Keating and Bradley (2015) provide 
the reference model assignments of requisite responsibilities and products. In Figure 7, we 
identify a preliminary assignment of the responsibilities with the corresponding meta functions. 
We also identify explicitly the governed systems (referred to as S1s) to place them in the 
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Setting policy at the NAVSEA Echelon 2 level that incorporates all the functions of the 
CSG model, which is inherently a risk communication and iterative continuous improvement 
cycle, can result in an SMS that is compliant with the new requirements for the Navy SMS 
framework. Developing procedures that adapt decision-making modalities and risk management 
practices based on system decomposition using the Cynefin framework support utilizing limited 
resources in a manner that is more likely to bring about meaningful change in shipboard 
industrial fire safety than seeking “one size fits all” solutions. Given that significant fires in the 
past decade on the USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44) and USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79) had similar 
root causes to historical fires on the SS Normandie and USS Saturn (AK 49), (McGowan & 
Smith, 2020), the current state mirrors NASA’s “‘failures of foresight’ in which history played a 
prominent role” (CAIB, 2003, p. 195). 
Identified Gaps  
Technical Authority 
There is not a single technical authority or TWH with responsibility for shipboard 
industrial fire safety. This role is split between NAVSEA 04RS responsibilities as the TWH for 
safety policy, NAVSEA 04X6 responsibility for maintaining the NAVSEA Industrial Ship Safety 
Manual for Fire Prevention and Response (8010 Manual), and NAVSEA 05P responsibility for 
damage and survivability, which includes the ship’s fixed fire protection systems. Other TWHs 
have input within their respective areas of responsibility, but decision-making and 
responsibilities do not roll up to a single entity. The lack of a TWH with overall responsibility can 
lead to issues such as contract negotiations over industrial fire protection and prevention 
requirements without the involvement of all relevant stakeholders. 
Technical Cognizance 
 In conjunction with the lack of an overarching TWH, there is not a clear flow down of 
technical requirements or a single entity responsible for adjudicating technical issues that arise 
in the domain of shipboard industrial fire safety. Nor do the activities performing the work have 
specific requirements to house this technical expertise internally. Where requirements are not 
clearly defined and rooted with a technical basis, decisions are made at the deckplate by 
individuals who may or may not have the expertise to make them. 
Weaknesses in Defense-in-Depth 
 Our initial work has indicated that the unwanted occurrence of significant fire events may 
be an indicator of an ineffective system to provide defense-in-depth. This potential gap will need 
to be explored further in later phases of this work.  
Lags in Incorporating Lessons Learned Into Contracts 
 Technical requirements related to shipboard industrial fire safety are typically found in 
NAVSEA Standard Items (standard specifications for ship repair and alteration), either directly 
or by reference to other documents, which may or may not be incorporated into every contract. 
Lessons learned from the USS MIAMI fire are still not fully incorporated into NSIs 9 years later, 
and even when new requirements are invoked, the multi-year nature of ship maintenance 
availabilities means that contractual requirements typically lag current recommendations. 
Contract Requirements Are Not Driven by Data 
 Trends are collected and analyzed by data; collection is not standardized and does not 
directly influence what is required in future contracts or contract modifications. Use of data is 
critical to the risk communication, risk monitoring, and change management fundamental 
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Conclusions  
There is not currently a uniform level of industrial fire safety during ship maintenance 
availabilities, primarily because there is not currently a cohesive governance model or 
framework that is driving specificity of requirements to manage risk. Rather than the current 
state of rote compliance (or noncompliance) to general requirements, contractual requirements 
should be data driven and vary based on risk, and there should be clear technical authority over 
setting these requirements and technical cognizance in ensuring they are met. Feedback loops 
between requirements and outcomes in conjunction with faster routes (such as contract 
modifications) to incorporate lessons learned into ship maintenance contracts support a higher 
level of safety through better management of the risks involved. Note that the underlying goal is 
not necessarily to avoid all fire due to the nature of the work but have defense-in-depth and 
“right-sized” work controls to prevent major fires and reduce the impact of minor ones while not 
unduly impacting production schedule or project cost. 
Planned Future Work  
 This paper is the first step in a concerted effort towards implementing data driven 
decision-making for industrial fire safety during ship maintenance availabilities by defining the 
governance model and SMS framework. NAVSEA 04RS has already done a significant amount 
of work analyzing human factors in historical fire incident data, and the intent is to continue to 
build upon their efforts. The next step is to further analyze available historical data to identify 
causal factors in why small fires become large, forming the basis of determining what 
standardized data needs to be collected to analyze future trends and inform contract 
requirements. We will also evaluate where and how more robust defense-in-depth principles 
can be incorporated. Then, we intend to create a standard data architecture and viewpoints for 
data-driven decision-making that could be implemented through creation of a new data 
repository held by a neutral third party.  
The long-term vision is for decision support systems that are a model-based engineering 
cross between tools like the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) database used for 
land-based fire reporting, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) maintained by NASA 
for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and more traditional project and program 
management dashboards. Having a tool such as this in the toolbox would allow the Navy, 
contractors, and the broader maritime repair industry to learn and evolve based on data from 
shipboard industrial fire incidents and near misses. 
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